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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
this is that although the plaintiff utilized Section 235 for service in
an action seeking divorce and alimony, the court held that the defen-
dant had, by interposing an answer, made a general appearance.
However, a dissent recognized that the application of Section 235 is
not yet settled. The position taken was that the defendant had not
subjected himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court and in
stating that the case should be remanded, added, "the effect of that
section (235) could be tested in that event." 102
RICHARD S. HOFFMAN,
GEORGE R. McELROY.
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY POLICYHOLDERS
During the past century there has been considerable expansion
and growth in the business of insurance, until today a large portion
of the wealth of this nation is in the hands of insurance companies.
Whenever there are large holdings and concentrations of wealth, there
will also be attempts at control by those who have, in any way, an
interest in such holdings. Such attempts are illustrated by those ac-
tions brought by policyholders under theories analogous to those
which lie behind a stockholders' derivative action. The existence of
the right of a policyholder to bring such a derivative action has re-
ceived scant clear-cut judicial or legislative recognition, therefore if
the right exists, it requires clarification as to its nature and extent.
Fundamentally, derivative actions were evolved for the purpose
of exercising an additional check on the management of a corporation
and as a further protection of those who had a beneficial interest in
its assets and affairs. There is no doubt that the stockholders' deriva-
tive action has proved a wholesome means of protecting the stock-
holder's interest, not only because it has afforded a means of obtaining
redress for injuries and wrongs actually inflicted but also because it
has prevented many acts of mismanagement. Since a corporation is
a separate entity, the ownership of all the property is in its name and
any cause of action that accrues belongs to the corporation and not
to the stockholders individually or collectively.1  The corporation
must act through its duly authorized agents, namely its officers and
Board of Directors, but they may not always act in the best interest
of the corporation or they may neglect to pursue the corporation's
rights. In theory, the stockholder has control over the management
202 Brainard v. Brainard, mipra note 100.
1 Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 15, 99 N. E. 138, 141
(1912).
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through voting rights in the corporate elections, but often these rights
are of little practical value. This is especially so where there is a
large body of stockholders whose individual interests are small, since
in any conflict between a stockholder and the management, the stock-
holder must rely on his individual means to obtain support, whereas
the management is financed by the corporation. When direct action
within the corporation has proved insufficient, the stockholder has
sought judicial aid through the derivative form of action. He is to
be considered merely as the instigator of the action, and he assumes
this role because he knows that his interest will suffer whenever any
injury or wrong to the corporation goes without redress.2
Primarily, it is the policyholders in mutual companies who seek
to bring derivative actions. When a policy is issued by a stock com-
pany, the relation is clearly one of contract and the policyholder pay-
ing a fixed premium, does not expect a voice in the management. He
is interested only in protection at reasonable rates. However, a
mutual company generally has no stockholders, and the policyholders
share in the profits that accrue. The paid-in premiums constitute a
fund out of which the individual policyholder or his beneficiary will
be paid on the happening of the contingency upon which the insurance
is based. The premiums which are charged by the company are al-
ways more than enough to cover the cost of the insurance. A margin
of safety must be maintained to offset any unavoidable increase in
death and disability over the actuaries' calculations. This fund is,
of course, invested by the company in order to further reduce the cost
of insurance. Any excess, surplus or profit is returned to the policy-
holder in the form of dividends.3 It is for this reason that policies
in a mutual company are termed participating.
It is easily understood why these policyholders, who share in the
surplus of the company, feel that they have the right to protect their
interest. Since there are no stockholders, and there is a considerable
amount of property and wealth controlled by the company, they con-
tend that they are the beneficial owners of these vast assets. The
fund is for their protection and the profits for their benefit. The offi-
cers and directors are their agents entrusted with management but
not with ownership. The title ownership is in the company as an
entity but since the ultimate ownership must exist in someone, the
policyholders argue that it is in them. Therefore, in addition to any
governmental controls, they believe that they have an absolute right
to bring an action in behalf of the company as a safeguard of their
interest or to prevent a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to them by
the directors.
2 For an excellent treatment of stockholders' derivative actions generally
see Hornstein, Legal Controls for Incorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41
COL. L. REV. 405 (1941).
s See Rhine v. New York Life Insurance Co., 248 App. Div. 120, 123-25,
289 N. Y. Supp. 117, 120-22 (Ist Dep't 1936); DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE IN-
SURANCE IN THE U14T STATES 155, 181 (Ist ed. 1944).
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In most instances, the courts have neglected to make any definite
statement affirming or denying this contention. Often the actions
were disallowed on other grounds and where the cause is sustained,
no specific treatment of the fact that the plaintiff is a policyholder is
given. It is unfortunate that Young v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society,4 which fully discusses the issue, must be considered as dicta
because of the peculiar fact situation involved. It warrants attention
here, nonetheless, since the language used so clearly summarizes the
theory which lies behind these actions. Henry T. Kellogg, J., who
wrote the opinion at Special Term, said, "It seems to me entirely
clear that, in a purely mutual company, the whole body of policy-
holders at any given time, whose policies are not yet mature, have a
quasi ownership in all the assets of the corporation, and are, like
stockholders of an ordinary corporation, in effect its cestuis que
trustent ... unless all the policyholders at a given moment in equity
own the corporate property, then we have the extraordinary spectacle
of a corporation, without members, without stockholders, a legal fic-
tion, an abstract idea, owning absolutely all corporate property, in
trust for no one, with responsibility to no one except creditors and
then only to pay debts. . . . Whatever the nature of a stockholder's
interest technically may be, he does, in effect, enjoy rights of owner-
ship in the corporate property; and, upon this broad ground, a rem-
edy is given him to compel his corporation to collect from its de-
linquent directors. The nature of a policyholder's interest in a mutual
company is very similar to that of an ordinary stockholder." 5 How-
ever, since the plaintiff was a stockholder as well as a policyholder
and the company was not purely a mutual company, the Appellate
Division based its affirmance on the ground that the plaintiff could
sue as a stockholder and her status as a policyholder need not have
been considered.6
Frequently this reference is made to fiduciary duties and trust
relationships in the cases involving derivative actions. The relation
of the directors of a corporation to the stockholders is said to be essen-
tially that of trustee and cestui que trust.7 But contrary to this,
many cases state that an insurance company does not hold any funds
in trust for a policyholder.8
449 Misc. 347, 99 N. Y. Supp. 446 (Sup. Ct. 1906), aff'd, 112 App. Div.760, 98 N. Y. Supp. 1052 (3d Dep't 1906).5 Young v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 49 Misc. 347, 361, 99 N. Y.
Supp. 446, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1906), aff'd, 112 App. Div. 760, 98 N. Y. Supp. 1052
(3d Dep't 1906).
6 Young v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 112 App. Div. 760, 98 N. Y.
Supp. 1052 (3d Dep't 1906).
7 See People ex dkel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N. Y. 194, 201, 94 N. E. 634,
637 (1911).
s Siegel v. Prudential Insurance Company, 286 N. Y. 618, 36 N. E. 2d 456
(1941); Silverman v. Pittsburg Life and Trust Co., 176 App. Div. 749, 753,
163 N. Y. Supp. 1011, 1013 (1st Dep't 1917) ; Russell v. Pittsburg Life and
Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 217, 116 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1st Dep't 1909) ; Equitable
Life Assurance Soc. v. Brown, 213 U. S. 25, 53 L. ed. 682 (1909); Greeff v.
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Uhlman v. New York Life Ins. Co.9 was an action for an ac-
counting by a policyholder who held what was termed a "ten year
dividend system policy" which entitled him to an equitable share in
the surplus of the company. It was held that in no sense was the
defendant a trustee of any fund for the plaintiff. The relation of the
company to the policyholder was one of debtor and creditor which
was measured by the terms of the pdlicy. The defendant had agreed
to distribute or apportion the surplus fund equitably but that did not
give the policyholder the right to an accounting since the management
of the fund was confined to the judgment, discretion and skill of the
officers and directors of the company. This case is often cited as an
authority for the proposition that a policyholder has not the capacity
to sue in a derivative action; but its weight is considerably weakened
by the fact that this was not a derivative action. The plaintiff sued
in his own name and for his own benefit; the action was against and
not for the company and would have only incidentally benefited the
other policyholders had 'the plaintiff been successful. The case is
important, however, since it does show a very decided attitude on the
part of the Court of Appeals with respect to an action based on a
trust relationship.
A stronger authority is Russell v. Pittsburg Life and Trust Co. 10
which refused to allow an action by the plaintiff-policyholder, wherein
he sought to enjoin a merger with another insurance company, on the
ground that he had no capacity to sue. The court, referring to
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown 11 in which the Supreme
Court of the United States reviewed the law in the State of New
York, said, "... it would seem that the doctrine that a policyholder
has a standing in court in an equitable action against the company
upon the ground that he is a cestui que trust has finally been set at
rest in accordance with the long line of decisions in the State of New
York by the final determination of the Supreme Court of the United
States." 12 The holding in Young v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society ' 3 was also expressly limited as an action by a stockholder.
As the court indicated, the doctrine did seem to be set at rest since
no policyholder's action of this nature reached the Court of Appeals
until 1941 when that court affirmed without opinion,14 a holding that
Equitable Life Assur. Society, 160 N. Y. 19, 54 N. E. 712 (1899); Uhlman v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. 421, 17 N. E. 363 (1888); People v.
Security Life Ins. and Annuity Co., 78 N. Y. 114 (1879); Cohen v. The N. Y.
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 50 N. Y. 610, 624 (1872) ; cf. Rhine v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 273 N. Y. 1, 6 N. E. 2d 74 (1936).-
9 109 N. Y. 421, 17 N. E. 363 (1888).
10 132 App. Div. 217, 116 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1st Dep't 1909).
11213 U. S. 25 53 L. ed. 682 (1909).2 Russell v. Pittsburg Life and Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 217, 229, 116
N. Y. Supp. 841, 849 (1st Dep't 1909).
1349 Misc. 347, 99 N. Y. Supp. 446 (Sup. Ct. 1906), affd, 112 App. Div.
760, 98 N. Y. Supp. 1052 (3d Dep't 1906).
14 Siegel v. Prudential Insurance Company, 286 N. Y. 618, 36 N. E. 2d 456
(1941).
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a policyholder was a mere creditor of the insurance company and as
such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity against the
officers and directors for acts of mismanagement or to enjoin waste
by reason of alleged ultra vires acts.
Therefore, it may be stated as a matter of law, that there is no
trust or fiduciary relationship between a policyholder and the insur-
ance company, the relation being merely that of debtor and creditor.
However, the absence of a trust relationship does not completely
resolve the issue since there are many other rights possessed by a
policyholder which are analogous to those of a stockholder, upon
which the right to sue in a derivative action may be based. A policy-
holder often may vote for directors, 15 inspect the records as to names
and addresses of other policyholders,' 6 and participate in the annual
surplus of the company." An indication that the right of a policy-
holder to sue does exist when all the proper requisites have been met
is found in several recent decisions,' 8 where the courts declined to
state that such right does not exist, even though the question was
squarely presented, but instead dismissed the complaints on other
grounds.
A discussion of these cases is held in abeyance since other ele-
ments of derivative actions must first be introduced. As was stated
earlier, the cause of action belongs to the corporation and before a
stockholder can bring a derivative action for any alleged wrongs, he
must show that the corporation itself has failed to seek a remedy.
He must make a demand through the Board of Directors or show
that such demand would be fruitless.' 9 The stockholder-plaintiff must
exhaust all the means within his reach to obtain redress before he
can come into equity for relief since he is not the real party in in-
terest.20 When the Superintendent of Banks has the power to regu-
late and interfere in the affairs of a banking corporation, a stock-
holder of a banking company has not exhausted all his means until
15N. Y. INsUInacn LAW § 198(1) (2).
26N. Y. INsuRANcE LAW § 198(3) (4) (5) (6).
"7N. Y. INsuPANcE LAW § 216(1).18 Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., - U. S. -, 91 L. ed. 764
(1947) (action dismissed on grounds of for.un non conveniens but court said
a policyholder's action is analogous to a stockholder's). In Clifford v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 264 App. Div. 168, 169, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 693, 695 (2d
Dep't 1942) the court said, "There remains, nevertheless, some doubt as to
the correctness of the contention of the directors that it must be held, as a
broad and arbitrary rule of law, that a policyholder has no standing to bring
a derivative action in behalf of his insurance company." In Shay v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., 172 Misc. 202, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1939),
aff'd, 260 App. Div. 958, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 870 (2d Dep't 1940) "... even though
it be assumed that the plaintiff has a standing in equity by reason of the owner-
ship of two policies .... "
29 Continefital Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138 (1912).
20 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881) (general dis-
cussion of the elements of derivative actions).
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he has made a demand and received a refusal from the Superin-
tendent to intervene.21
If the analogy be closely drawn it might be presented with great
force that before a policyholder may bring a derivative suit he should
first seek intervention by the Superintendent of Insurance. The com-
plaints in both Clifford v'. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 22 and
Shay v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.23 were dismissed on this
ground, reference being made to the section of the Insurance Law
pertaining to examinations by the Superintendent. To fully under-
stand the effect of our present statute, tracing its historical develop-
ment is indispensable. This brings us back to the Uhinan case which
in its closing statement struck the keynote argument against allowing
these suits without check. "Of course it is not to be supposed that
each individual policyholder would avail himself of this right, but
the fact that each one might, would place the company in the power
of unscrupulous parties to take advantage of it for the purpose of
endeavoring to levy contribution from it which it might pay in order
to secure freedom to itself from troublesome, expensive, unnecessary
and wholly disingenuous investigations (and made in numerous suits)
into the affairs of the company and its accounts running through many
-years." 24 As a direct result of this statement a section 2 5 was added
to the Insurance Law in 1892 which provided that any interference
with the internal affairs of an insurance company must be made by
the Attorney General. This section apparently was framed to pre-
vent the intolerable nuisance to which an insurance company would
be subjected if any one of its many policyholders was allowed to
maintain a derivative action. As a matter of public policy it must
be deemed much more desirable that the control over a business so
invested with public interest, be exercised by a public officer rather
than by any individual policyholder whose knowledge of the intri-
cacies of the business of insurance may be very limited. Although
poorly worded, since it did not state that a policyholder could not sue
but provided that no order, judgment or decree be made except on
petition of the Attorney General, this section was effectively pleaded
as a bar to several actions. 26 It was held to be constitutional since
21 Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N. Y. 257, 266, 179 N. E. 487, 491 (1932).
22 264 App. Div. 168, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (2d Dep't 1942).
23 172 Misc. 202, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1939).24 Uhlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. 421, 435, 17 N. E. 363, 368
(1888).
25 N. Y. Laws of 1892, c. 690, § 56.
"No order, judgment or-decree providing for an accounting or enjoining,
restraining or interfering with the prosecution of the business of any domestic
insurance corporation or appointing a temporary or permanent receiver thereof
shall be made or granted otherwise than upon the application of the attorney-
general, on his own motion or after his approval of a request in writing therefor
of the superintendent of insurance, except in an action by a judgment-creditor
or in proceedings supplementary to execution."
26 Russell v. Pittsburg Life and Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 217, 116 N. Y.
Supp. 841 (1st Dep't 1909); Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Brown, 213
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it did not deprive a policyholder of any right but merely changed his
form of remedy.27
The Insurance Law was revised in 1909 and the entire Chapter
690, Laws of 1892, was repealed. 28 However, the revised statute
contained a section which required the Superintendent of Insurance
to make an examination into the affairs of any insurance corporation
upon the request of a policyholder. 29 This section may be considered
as the equivalent of Section 56 of the repealed code. It is therefore
clear that the State continued to frown on any suit which interfered
with the management of an insurance company when brought by
anyone other than a proper public official.
The dismissal of the complaint in Shay v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. was based on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show
that he had exhausted all the remedies afforded him by this section.
However, in 1939, while this case was being prepared for appeal, the
legislature again revised the Insurance Law repealing the entire In-
surance Chapter of the Laws of 1909.80 The dismissal was affirmed
by the Appellate Division,"' and the case was annotated under Sec-
tion 28 of the present law,8 2 which is the counterpart of Section 40.
Although the wording has been completely altered, 83 the powers of
U. S. 25, 53 L. ed. 682 (1909); Greeff v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 160
N. Y. 19, 54 N. E. 712 (1899) ; Perry v. Miutual Reserve Fund Life Associa-
tion 41 App. Div. 626 (2d Dep't 1899); Swan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 155 N. Y. 9, 49 N. E. 258 (1898).27 Swan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 155 N. Y. 9, 49 N. E. 258(1898). Contra: dissenting opinion by Woodward, J., in Perry v. Mutual Re-
serve Fund Life Association, 41 App. Div. 626 (2d Dep't -1899).28 N. Y. Laws of 1909, c. 35, §§ 360, 361.
29 N. Y. Laws of 1909, c. 33, § 40. Examination by superintendent upon
request of stockholder, policyholder or creditor. "The superintendent shall
make an examination into the affairs of any insurance corporation doing busi-
ness in this state, whenever any stockholder, policyholder or judgment creditor
of any such corporation shall, by a declaration subscribed and sworn to by him,
notify the superintendent of facts within the knowledge of the person making
the declaration, and stated therein, or within the knowledge of persons whose
affidavits stating the same are presented therewith, which in the judgment of
the superintendent make such an examination advisable'0N. Y. IxsuRANca LAW §§ 600, 601.
81 Shay v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 958, 24 N. Y. S. 2d
870 (2d Dep't 1940).
82 27 McKINNEx's CONSoL. LAWS § 28, n. 1.
8s N. Y. INsuRANcE LAW § 28.
"Examination of insurers; when authorized or required.
"1. The superintendent may make an examination into the affairs of any
insurance corporation or- other insurer doing any insurance business in this
state or authorized to do an insurance business in this state or, of any pension
fund, retirement system or other organization which is required by law to make
reports to, or is subject to examination by, the insurance department as often
as he deems it expedient for the protection of the interests of the people of
this state, in addition to examinations authorized by the other provisions of
this chapter.
"2. The superintendent shall make an examination into the affairs
"(a) of every domestic life insurance company, every cooperative life and
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the Superintendent have not been changed.3 4
The intention of the legislature is evidenced by the language
which was used in the section. The first paragraph reads that the
Superintendent naqy make an examination as often as he deems it
expedient. Although there is no longer any reference to a demand
by a policyholder for such examination, it is apparent that the Super-
intendent has the power to act in any case which may be brought to
his attention. When this paragraph is read in connection with para-
graph (2) which provides that the Superintendent shall make an ex-
amination of certain insurance companies every three years, there is
no doubt that the legislature did not intend to make any change in
the policy indicated by the earlier statutes or to limit the inquisitorial
powers of the Superintendent.
The primary purpose of a policyholder in an insurance company
is not the same as that of a stockholder in a corporation. The stock-
holder's purpose is to derive pecuniary profit from his investment
whereas a policyholder seeks security and protection at reasonable
rates. The need for control over the insurance companies is apparent
but the interest of the policyholder will be more properly safeguarded
by governmental regulations than by derivative suits. Therefore, the
Superintendent of Insurance with his broad powers should be re-
garded as the representative of the public and the policyholders.
This view was affirmed in Clifford v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., which held that a request on the Superintendent of Insurance
to exercise his powers under Section 28 of the Insurance Law was a
condition precedent to the bringing of a derivative action.
Many of these suits present situations where a policyholder seeks
to force his own legal theory or economic point of view on the com-
pany. A comparison of the Clifford and Shay cases clearly illus-
trates this point. During the years of 1938 to 1942 there were sev-
eral self-termed "Insurance Advisors" who advertised over the radio
to the effect that they could procure policies at reduced costs, that the
large companies charged exorbitant rates and that insurance agents
generally made false representations to prospective policyholders in
order to secure commissions for themselves. They offered advice and
services to those who would call at their offices. Shay, a policyholder
in the Metropolitan Company, brought a derivative suit to enjoin
waste of the company's assets by the directors when they expended
certain sums for radio broadcasts advising the public not to consult
accident insurance company, every domestic casualty insurance company, every
domestic surety company, and every authorized domestic fraternal benefit so-
ciety, at least once in every three years; and
"(b) of every other authorized domestic insurance company or authorized
domestic insurer and every rating organization at least once in every five years."
84 See PiNx, TENTATIVE DRAFT OF REViSED INSURANcE LAW (1937), Intro-
ductory comment by Professor Edwin W. Patterson, Chairman, Committee on
Insurance Law Revision (p. x), "The inquisitorial powers of the Department
remain substantially unchanged."
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these Insurance Advisors.35 Clifford, on the other hand, sought to
compel the same company to take action against these Insurance
Advisors whom he termed as "conspirators." 86 Both of these suits
were dismissed for failure to first consult the Superintendent of In-
surance. Neither need have been brought and considerable expense
to the company and therefore to the policyholders could have been
avoided.
In New York, stockholders' derivative suits are generally
brought under Article 6 of the General Corporation Law. The atti-
tude of the legislature as evidenced by recent additions and revisions
of this article,37 has been to limit the stockholder's derivative suit.
A prominent authority called this legislation "the death knell of stock-
holders' derivative suits in New York." 8 Security for expenses is
required where a stockholder does not own more than five per cent
of the outstanding stock unless his interest exceeds fifty thousand
dollars.3 9 Provisions in the by-laws may provide that officers and
directors be indemnified for reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees which are incurred in the successful defense of any action brought
against them under this article.40 There is no longer any provision
for attorneys' fees for the stockholder-plaintiff since it was said that
repealed Section 61a which formerly so provided was unnecessary
because it merely affirmed the common law right of a successful plain-
tiff to costs. How severe a blow to the stockholder's derivative suit
this legislation will prove remains to be answered in the future. But
it surely can be seen that any present attempt by a policyholder to
bring a derivative suit based on the analogy of a stockholder's suit
will be met at the outset with .the obstacles furnished by this
legislation.
Conclusion
While it cannot be stated as an established rule of law that a
policyholder has no standing in equity to bring a derivative action
in behalf of his company, it is at least certain that any attempt to
bring such action is beset with many difficulties and conditions. That
he has an equitable interest cannot be denied but the courts consis-
tently hold that the company does not hold any funds in trust for him.
He must first try to compel the company to take action, through a
s5 Shay v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 172 Misc. 202, 14 N. Y. S. 2d
347 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 958, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 870 (2d Dep't
1940).
38 Clifford v. Metropolitaq Life Insurance Co., 264 App. Div. 168, 34 N. Y.
S. 2d 693 (2d Dep't 1942).
37 N. Y. Laws of 1945, c. 869, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, which repealed section sixty-
one-a and added sections sixty-one-b, and sections sixty-three to sixty-eight.
38 Hornstein, New Aspects Qf Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L.
Rv. 1, 2 (1947).
N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b.
40 N. Y. Gan. CoRp. LAW §§ 63, 64.
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request to the Board of Directors, and failing this, he must request
the Superintendent of Insurance to intervene. Then if the provi-
sions of Article 6 of the General Corporation Law apply to him, he
must supply security for expenses, if he does not hold five per cent
of the outstanding policies or if his interest does not exceed fifty
thousand dollars. Therefore, if the right of a policyholder to bring
a derivative action exists, it is so limited that it is of little practical
value under the present state of our law.
ANDREw L. HUGHES.
THE EMPLOYER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Equality of opportunity and freedom of action are inherent
rights of individuals under any socio-economic system such as our
own democracy. Unlimited freedom of action permitted to one group,
however, will inevitably infringe upon the goal of equality of oppor-
tunity, toward which all strive. The reason for this is apparent: just
as the law of physics states, as a fundamental precept, that every ac-
tion has an equal and opposite reaction, so we find in economics that
in any given field where two or more persons have their individual
interests, the actions of one taken in his own behalf, will prove cor-
respondingly detrimental to the others. The struggle between labor
and management gives perhaps the greatest example of the conflict.
The relationship of employer and employee necessarily results
in the economic dominance of the employer over the employee, and
this in turn leads to the imposition, to at least some extent, of the
will of the employer upon that of the employee. In the words of the
National Labor Relations Board: "In the normal relationship be-
tween employer and employee, almost any expression of opinion by
the employer indicating to those who depend upon his continued good
will for their livelihood an unequivocal disapproval of their forming
or joining a labor organization characteristically carries home to em-
ployees an implied threat of unlawful discrimination for non-
compliance with the employer's desires."' We find here, therefore,
an instance wherein we are compelled in the interest of society to re-
strict the freedom of activity of one group, the employers, so that
another group, the employees, may achieve the desired goal of equality
of opportunity. But what is the nature of this restriction, and what
limitation is placed upon it by the Constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech? 2
1 Southern Colorado Power Co., 13 N. L. IL B. 699 (1939).2U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. I. Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
19471
